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Abstract 
The very different institutional contributions of large-scale American aid to Egypt, Jordan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan are best explained by different authoritarian coalitions in each aid recipient. 
Rulers in Egypt and Jordan have based their rule on highly disparate, distributive coalition 
strategies and have thus incorporated foreign aid into institutions of patronage, while donor-
financed parallel institutions also provide public goods and thereby allow central patronage 
institutions to remain in place. By contrast, rulers in South Korea and Taiwan relied upon narrow, 
developmental coalitions and used American financial and technical assistance to create new, 
more efficient institutions. As a geopolitically-concerned donor, the U.S. was acutely aware of 
coalition pressures in each recipient and configured aid as such. 
 
Introduction 
 The cases of Egypt, Jordan, South Korea, and Taiwan are often-cited empirical 
discrepancies in the grand theories of the aid literature. Egypt and Jordan have received massive 
quantities of assistance from the U.S. and other sources over a prolonged period of time. Jordan 
has displayed “surprisingly poor growth coincident with having relatively good economic 
policies and inflows of aid (Burnside and Dollar 2004, 783),” while “high levels of assistance 
often seem to be inversely related to Egypt‟s ability to use the aid effectively or wisely 
(Weinbaum 1986, 2).” Egypt and Jordan have incorporated foreign aid into institutions of 
patronage and distribution that undermine economic development more broadly, consistent with 
theories of aid-induced rentierism, while donor-financed parallel institutions within these 
countries provide public goods and thereby allow central patronage institutions to remain in 
place. Yet South Korea and Taiwan, also recipients of large-scale American assistance after the 
Second World War, are cited as rare success stories, where U.S. aid contributed to savings and 
investment, made the bureaucracy more meritocratic and insular, provided growth incentives for 
a rising capitalist class, and did not undermine revenue collection (Jacoby 1967; Amsden 1989; 
Wade 1990; Woo 1991; Kohli 2004). 
 
 All four countries were of geostrategic interest to their major donor, the U.S., which was 
extremely unwilling to use conditionality that might destabilize pro-American regimes. 
Nevertheless, the East Asian countries utilized U.S. aid more effectively than those in the Middle 
East. This divergence in outcomes indicates that aid might contribute to or produce very different 
institutional patterns independently of its volume or donor intent. Why has foreign aid fueled 
highly distributive, inefficient states in Egypt and Jordan while making positive contributions to 
developmental states in South Korea and Taiwan? This project describes the impact of U.S. 
foreign assistance upon state institutions in each of these four countries and tries to account for 
its variable impact.   
 
 Authoritarian rulers were subject to the constraints imposed by the preferences of 
coalition members, compelling them to use aid in different ways.  In Egypt and Jordan, rulers 
were bound by disparate and costly coalitions consisting of business groups and subaltern 
classes. These coalitions emerged independently of foreign aid and resulted in distributive 
spending, minimal extraction, a politicized bureaucracy, rent-satisfying modes of state economic 
intervention, and collusive state-capitalist relations. The cost of maintaining a disparate coalition 
introduced a major structural deficit into the state budget, and these countries became reliant on 
various sources of external rent, including foreign aid, to meet coalition demands. In these cases, 
U.S. aid had two effects. First, it sustained inefficient distributive institutions beyond the period 
of time that normal economic conditions would have permitted. Second, because the U.S. has 
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been willing to commit large amounts of aid over the long term to ensure regime stability in 
these two countries, it has used its aid to establish and maintain “parallel institutions” that 
provide essential public goods outside of the central patronage state, thus allowing distributive 
institutions to remain in place and domestic politics to remain stable.  
 
 In Taiwan and South Korea (though more so under Park Chung-Hee than under Syngman 
Rhee), rulers were freed by unified and inexpensive coalitions. To some extent, aid was diverted 
to coalition members, but since the coalition was relatively small, aid could also be used to 
establish new, more efficient bureaucracies and to discipline rent-seeking capitalists. Many of 
these institutions, such as a pilot agency that coordinates development efforts and formulates 
policy, started out as U.S.-supported parallel institutions that would aid in post-war 
reconstruction. By contrast to the Middle Eastern cases, parallel institutions in South Korea and 
Taiwan were short-lived. They were quickly incorporated into the central state as governments 
assumed responsibility for providing public goods to their respective societies.  
 
 The goal of this chapter, and the broader project of which it is a part, is to stress the 
primacy of coalition politics in explaining the impact of aid upon state institutions; this is done 
through description and, at most, mid-range theory.  The project integrates abstract tenets from 
three different literatures (foreign aid, rentier state, and comparative political economy) with a 
close examination of U.S. aid to Egypt, Jordan, South Korea, and Taiwan, four key cases that 
have otherwise been classified as outliers in the broader work on foreign aid. Observations 
regarding coalition politics, aid effectiveness, and institutions in these four countries have the 
potential to coalesce into a more general theory, and, as such, this project carefully defines 
foreign aid, coalition strategies, and institutional contributions in anticipation that these could 
become antecedent, independent, and dependent variables, respectively, in a general theory. 
These will need to be supplemented by a derivation of actor preferences and the delineation of 
institutional constraints to produce a more general utility function, whether formally or 
informally. This can be a future project. 
 
 The chapter proceeds in five parts. It first provides a brief summary of theoretical holes in 
the aid literature, which were more extensively detailed in Chapter 1, and makes a case for a new 
approach centered on domestic politics. The second section provides a rationale for case 
selection and a discussion of the project‟s qualitative methodology. The third section outlines a 
new argument centered on the domestic coalition politics of aid recipients. The fourth section 
briefly summarizes the cases, which will be fleshed out in subsequent chapters. The fifth and 
final section summarizes the theoretical and empirical contributions of the project, and provides 
a chapter layout for the rest of the dissertation. 
 
The Insufficiency of the “Supply Side” 
 The important empirical discrepancies provided by Egypt, Jordan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan reveal greater theoretical weaknesses in existing approaches to the study of foreign aid 
and economic development. These problems are evident in both econometric studies that are 
championed by development economists and qualitative studies on the Middle Eastern “rentier 
state” that are usually the purview of political scientists.  Econometric studies concerned purely 
with aid and per capita GDP growth have failed to produce strong empirical evidence supporting 
this relationship in either direction (Rajan and Subramanian 2006; Easterly 2006), and a number 
 5 
of studies have challenged the mechanisms of the “Big Push” to which aid has traditionally been 
believed to contribute (Boone 1995, 1996; Kraay and Radatz 2005; Easterly 2006). Scholars 
have subsequently modified this research agenda by examining conditions under which aid is 
more or less effective, such as regime type or the nature of macroeconomic policy (Burnside and 
Dollar 2000; Bearce 2008). This is a step in the right direction, yet these studies employ a very 
thin consideration of institutions that precludes an understanding of exceptional cases like Egypt 
and Jordan. They have also been challenged on methodological and empirical grounds 
(McPherson 2000; Dalgaard and Hansen 2001; Hansen and Tarp 2000, 2001; Lensink and White 
2001; Easterly et al 2004). Work that posits a negative relationship between aid and 
taxation/extraction has generally been more statistically sound (Heller 1975; Kimbrough 1980; 
Khan and Hoshino 1992; Khiliji and Zampelli 1994; Feyzioglu et al 1998; Brautigam and Knack 
2004; Remmer 2004). Yet, like the “Big Push” literature, there are important exceptions for 
which these models cannot account—namely, South Korea and Taiwan, which continued to tax 
their populations even as they received massive American assistance. The assumption that aid 
inherently alters fiscal policy is highly contestable yet it is evident in all of these studies. 
 
 The fundamental problem in the aid literature to date is an overemphasis on the volume 
of aid, or the “supply side,” as the principal causal variable in explaining institutional and 
economic development (Peters and Moore 2009). In this sense, the scholarship on foreign aid 
shares many of the detractions evident in the broader literature on external rents, particularly oil 
revenues. Foreign aid and oil revenues both fall under the category of “external rent,” or 
unearned income, that accrues directly to the state. Both are typically presented as structural 
variables that exert uniform, independent, and generally negative effects on state institutions, 
politics, and economics in any context.  
 
 The literature on the “rentier state,” for instance, claims that external rents undermine 
developmental institutions through two principal means.  First, different societal groups forfeit 
participation in the policy process in exchange for protected markets, subsidies, public 
employment, and tax breaks. This concession breaks important channels of communication 
between the state and the private sector, and many of the institutions used to “buy” support of 
different social groups can be harmful to sustainable economic growth.  Second, external rents 
relieve the state of extracting domestic revenue as a means of regenerating itself. To the extent 
that the state relies on taxes, there may be little incentive to develop the domestic economy as a 
means of cultivating a taxable domestic surplus (Luciani 1987). Without an extractive 
bureaucracy, there is little incentive or capability to centralize the fiscal apparatus, obtain 
information on producers and generate economic data, set fiscal priorities, and establish effective 
private sector regulation (Chaudhry 1997). Regime elites can avoid the politically painful 
process of constructing developmental institutions—leaving in place those rent-seeking practices 
that undermine economic activity. 
 
 Supply side theories produce few explanations relevant to the four cases considered here. 
Rather, it is the “demand side” of external rents that is most illuminating—those domestic 
political conditions that greet rents as they enter a recipient and condition their use. Extant 
approaches to the study of foreign aid overlook this very political side of economy, which a large 
and robust literature credits with determining important institutional outcomes, such as fiscal 
practices, the nature of the bureaucracy, state-capitalist relations, and modes of state economic 
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intervention (Bates 1981, 2001; Olson 1982; Anderson 1986; Migdal 1988; Crystal 1989; 
Barnett 1992; Tilly 1992; Geddes 1994; Chaudhry 1997; Ertman 1997; Waldner 1999; Herbst 
2000; Kang 2002; Centeno 2003; Kohli 2004; Doner et al 2005). Firmly rooted in comparative 
political economy, this largely qualitative literature utilizes coalition politics, colonial legacies, 
and domestic and international political competition to explain institutional development. 
Although some of these scholars insert ad hoc descriptive accounts of external rents into 
pertinent cases, few integrate external rents, let alone foreign aid, into their theoretical 
frameworks. Indeed, many of the same institutions are found in countries with and without 
access to foreign aid. 
 
 The least common denominator in much of this literature is what Migdal (1988) terms the 
“politics of survival” in late developing countries. The concept of late development is rooted in 
the notion that additional state intervention is necessary for a country to industrialize in a world 
economy already populated with industrialized states (Gerschenkron 1962). Smith (2007, 3) 
defines late industrialization as 
 
a set of policies in which „the state explicitly nurtures the development of private sector 
capital and labor, relying on a variety of means—financial, social, political, and 
infrastructural (Bellin 2002, 3-4)‟ as well as more directly interventionist policies such as 
the creation of state-owned industrial enterprises and state-granted monopolies in key 
sectors. 
 
The process of late industrialization is important because it entails a complete restructuring of 
production and consumption, the creation of new institutions, and the destruction of old ones in a 
very short period of time. These processes can affect the distribution of power in the state and 
society and produce substantial political conflict. Leaders prefer to implement late development 
in the least costly way and, as such, the means by which a ruler survives during this period 
fundamentally affect state economic institutions and policies.  
 
  External rents, including foreign aid, are an important resource available to rulers during 
late development. Any account of external rent distribution should make some attempt to explain 
the distributional politics of external rents. Which groups seek rents and why, and what factors 
condition their success? Why does the recipient regime accommodate their preferences? Does 
the implementation of these preferences have institutional implications? Taking the politics of 
coalition maintenance seriously--particularly in a non-democratic context--means abandoning 
crude arguments that rent distribution buys policy autonomy (Peters and Moore 2009).  
 
 In the past five years, a revisionist literature on the rentier state has tried to answer many 
of these questions. Drawing on empirical discrepancies in most-similar cases, this literature 
abandons the notion that external rents are structural variables that carry inherent distributional 
incentives. Rather, external rents are either an antecedent condition or an intervening variable, 
and their institutional effects are the result of interaction with domestic politics and/or 
institutions that have been addressed by the broader CPE literature. Herb (1999), for example, 
argues that the durability of petromonarchies in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is the result of 
institutionalized mechanisms for succession being in place before the oil boom. Smith (2007) 
finds that oil revenues were used for improving institutions of extraction and local governance in 
Indonesia because they arrived after the rise of a powerful opposition party, whereas in Iran, a 
 7 
typical “rentier state,” they did not. Peters and Moore (2009) argue that aid-based rentierism in 
Jordan is the result of a “disparate coalition” that is extraordinarily expensive to maintain, 
compelling rulers to route foreign aid to its various constituent parts. What is now needed is a 
study that systematically integrates the study of foreign aid with the theoretical contributions of 
comparative political economy. How does aid interact with regime maintenance, state-building 
processes, and late development? How do these processes matter for institutional outcomes?  
 
   
Figure 1 
Approaches to the Study of External Rents, Domestic Politics, and Institutions 
 
A. “Supply-Side” Theories 
 
 Independent Variable                                                                       Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Comparative Political Economy 
 
                                                    Independent Variable                    Dependent Variable 
                                                     
     
 
 
  
 
C. A “Two-Sided” Approach 
 
Antecedent Conditions                 Independent Variable                     Dependent Variable 
      (supply)                                         (demand) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign  
Aid 
 
Institutional 
Outcomes 
 
Domestic 
Politics 
Institutional 
Durability 
Foreign Aid 
 
Domestic  
Politics 
 
Institutional 
Outcomes 
Mineral Rents 
Location Rents 
Institutional 
Origins 
 8 
 Figure 1 contains three diagrams. Diagram A depicts the traditional “supply-side” 
approach towards the study of aid and institutions. Diagram B depicts the general approach of 
the comparative political economy literature. Diagram C combines the two, reducing aid (along 
with other categories of external rent) to an antecedent condition and elevating domestic politics 
to the position of an independent variable. Distributive institutions, such as those found in Egypt, 
are also found in countries without such bountiful access to foreign aid, but which do experience 
similar domestic political pressures. Waldner, for instance, finds that the inclusion of subaltern 
classes in regime coalitions is a sufficient condition for highly distributional “precocious 
Keynesian” states in Syria and Turkey. Waldner concedes that aid may have helped to sustain 
distributive institutions, but had no causal role in their formation. This is to say that we should 
pretty well be able to predict the nature of state institutions by examining coalition composition. 
These institutions may come to rely on foreign aid for their durability, but they were not created 
by foreign aid itself. By designating foreign aid as an antecedent condition and incorporating 
domestic politics as an independent variable, a theory along the lines of Diagram C can account 
for both the (often dynamic) nature of the domestic demands on aid and the continued supply of 
it by donors—a “two-sided” approach (Peters and Moore 2009). 
 
 Depending on context, the dependent variable in a theory modeled on Diagram C can be 
designated as either institutional origins and/or durability. Although this project will occasionally 
refer to these outcomes collectively as “institutional contributions,” it is important to distinguish 
between these two concepts. Utilizing institutional durability as a dependent variable will 
generate more modest claims. It refers to the contributions that aid makes to institutions that 
originated independently of donor financial and technical assistance. For example, rulers may 
initiate patronage-based public employment in the absence of foreign aid, even though foreign 
aid may provide some of the financial fuel for this relationship. It would be a mistake to attribute 
the emergence of this collusive relationship solely to the filtering of aid through domestic 
politics. Rather, aid contributed to the durability of an existing institution. It may even have done 
so alongside other sources of external rent.   
 
 However, there are some situations in which one might claim that the interaction between 
aid and politics is a sufficient condition for institutional origins. This can occur in two situations. 
The first is where the recipient displays exclusive fiscal or technical dependence on foreign aid 
for the genesis of the institution. Institutions require financial fuel and technical expertise. If it 
can be shown that a significant portion of these finances or expertise (ideally, a theoretical cutoff 
point that distinguishes institutional maintenance or genesis from collapse or nonexistence) are 
derived from foreign aid, we can legitimately state that foreign aid interacting with domestic 
politics produces an institution. The second situation, drawing upon a similar logic, occurs when 
foreign aid constitutes an institutional outcome in itself. The most notable examples are “parallel 
institutions” which are financed and staffed by donor organizations. In either of these two 
scenarios, the counterfactual is that without the financial and technical expertise provided by 
foreign aid, these institutions would not exist. Most institutional origins identified in this project 
are parallel institutions, generally due to the difficulty of locating the point at which aid becomes 
necessary for institutional genesis.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Luciani claims that rentier states are produced when greater than 40 percent of domestic revenues being provided 
by external rent. However, this baseline has no theoretical justification and can account for neither the necessity of 
technical assistance nor aid‟s necessity in the case of individual institutions. 
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Case Selection and Method  
  Egypt, Jordan, South Korea, and Taiwan have been included in this project based on 
their conduciveness to existing tools of qualitative methods, as well their ability to remedy gaps 
in the descriptive and theoretical literature on foreign aid.  Egypt and Jordan have topped the list 
of U.S. aid recipients in the past fifty years, yet we still know little about aid‟s interaction with 
domestic politics and institutions in these countries. Scholarly accounts of Egypt and Jordan limit 
their focus to aid volume or individual projects while official reports frequently measure aid 
outcomes in terms of aid inputs. We know much more about U.S. aid in South Korea and Taiwan 
through a large secondary literature, as well as more frank accounts of these missions that were 
written by American policymakers and subsequently declassified. South Korea and Taiwan are 
thus included in this study less for the purpose of description and more for the necessary 
variation that they introduce on the dependent variable.  
 
 This project utilizes a two-stage qualitative framework that employs Mill‟s Methods and 
causal process tracing/ congruency tests. The goal of this methodology is to combine causal 
accounts with the elimination of rival hypotheses. Mill‟s Methods of Agreement and Difference 
allow for the deductive elimination of relevant monocausal and deterministic causal variables 
from the explanation. Then causal process-tracing allows for the delineation of causal 
mechanisms, thereby enhancing the internal quality of theory, and congruence-testing allows for 
the inductive elimination of rival causal claims by demonstrating that they do not operate in 
particular cases (George and McKeown 1985; Waldner 1999, 234-235).  Given the paucity of 
good theory on foreign aid and development, as well as the lack of solid descriptive accounts of 
U.S. aid in Egypt and Jordan, this methodology is strategic. Qualitative analysis allows us to 
unpack the long-unpacked black box of domestic politics in a way that statistical analysis does 
not, maximizing the internal validity of theory and providing focused historical accounts of the 
cases in question.  
 
 Mill‟s Method of Difference allows for the elimination of possible causal variables by 
observing cases with similar initial conditions and different outcomes: “Nothing can be the cause 
of a phenomenon if the phenomenon does not take place when the supposed cause does (Cohen 
and Nagel 1934, 259).” The Middle Eastern and East Asian cases display very different 
institutional outcomes even though they share similar initial conditions, many of which past 
accounts have designated as causal determinants of the effects of foreign aid. Although the 
universe of rival hypotheses is infinite, I focus on these variables for elimination. 
 
 Large scale foreign aid. Following the lead of scholars writing on oil-based rentier states, 
several studies of Middle Eastern aid recipients designate large-scale aid as a sufficient condition 
for the emergence of distributive institutions (Lavy and Sheffer 1991; Knowles 2005). Although 
levels of U.S. aid, or foreign aid in general, are not exactly equivalent in terms of population, 
GDP, investment, or government expenditures, there is no question that all four countries have 
been the recipients of large-scale U.S. assistance.  
 
 Between 1947 and 1986 South Korea received $68.6 billion in total economic and 
military assistance, with economic assistance averaging roughly $1.06 billion until 1976 (USAID 
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2007).
2
 By 1949, the ECA office in Seoul dwarfed its counterparts in Greece and Turkey; the 
Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) employed 500 people; and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul 
was the largest in the world. From 1953 to 1960, U.S. aid was equivalent to 10 percent of GDP 
per year on average, financing 70 percent of imports and 74 percent of total investment (Kohli 
2004, 76).   
  
 Between 1946 and 1976, Taiwan received $37.8 billion in total U.S. aid, with economic 
aid averaging about $777 million per year through 1965 (USAID 2007). During the 1950s, U.S. 
aid constituted about 6 percent of Taiwan‟s GDP on average, and until the mid-1960s, the U.S. 
financed about 40 percent of gross investment (Ranis 1979, 244-246; Wade 1990, 81-82; Wu 
2005, 56). As it had in South Korea, the U.S. also helped to finance and administer the 
Kuomintang‟s (KMT) land reform project in the early 1950s (Wade 1990, 76, 83). 
 
 Between 1957 and 2006, Jordan received $17 billion in total U.S. aid, with economic aid 
averaging about $189 million per year. Total U.S. aid was equivalent to about 5.5 percent of 
annual GDP on average (USAID 2007, World Bank 2007). U.S. leadership in IFIs has also 
resulted in additional rents for Jordan. The Paris Club forgave $830 million and extended 
payments on $2.2 billion of Jordan‟s foreign debt through 1997; the IMF has continually allowed 
Jordan to sidestep conditionality; and the World Bank has provided several hundred million 
dollars in loans to implement IMF structural adjustment programs.  
 
 The largest and most consistent volume of U.S. aid to Egypt has been delivered since 
President Anwar Sadat‟s 1974 rapprochement with the West. Egypt received $94.1 billion in 
U.S. aid between 1975 and 2006, and is one of the most widely studied cases of U.S. foreign 
assistance in the world (Abdel Khalek 1982; Burns 1985; Weinbaum 1986; Handoussa 1990; 
Bangura 1995; Alterman 2002; Mitchell 2002). After signing the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 
1979, Egypt was informally committed about $2 billion per year, $815 million in economic 
assistance and $1.3 billion in military aid.
3
 This arrangement lasted until 1998, when the 
American and Egyptian governments agreed to reduce economic assistance by 50 percent over 
ten years, leaving the economic component of the 2008 aid package at roughly $450 million. 
After Egypt‟s participation in 1991‟s Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. and her Paris Club 
counterparts forgave half of Egypt‟s external debt contingent on deep reforms and a sharp 
reduction in the deficit. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Unless otherwise noted, figures are in constant 2006 dollars to adjust for inflation, allowing a comparison among 
the four cases, which received the majority of their aid in different periods. 
3
 These figures are cited in historic dollars, as the U.S. aid package to Egypt is not adjusted annually for inflation. 
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Figure 2 
  
Source: USAID, 2007. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
U.S. Aid Per Capita, 1950-2006
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
19
50
19
53
19
56
19
59
19
62
19
65
19
68
19
71
19
74
19
77
19
79
19
82
19
85
19
88
19
91
19
94
19
97
20
00
20
03
20
06
Year
C
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
2
0
0
6
 D
o
ll
a
r
s
Taiwan South Korea Egypt Jordan
 
                 Source: Kuznets 1979; USAID Greenbook, 2007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. Economic and Military Aid, 1946-2006
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
19
46
19
49
19
52
19
55
19
58
19
61
19
64
19
67
19
70
19
73
19
76
19
79
19
82
19
85
19
88
19
91
19
94
19
97
20
00
20
03
20
06
Year
C
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
2
0
0
6
 $
, 
M
il
li
o
n
s
Egypt
Jordan
Taiwan
South Korea
 12 
Figure 4 
U.S. Aid, 1950-2006
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 Geopolitical Relevance.  Some scholars have suggested that economic and institutional 
development will be stunted in U.S. allies because of a non-developmental donor agenda 
(McKinlay and Little 1977, 1978; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Frey and Schneider 1986; 
Trumbull and Wall 1994; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Burnside and Dollar 2000, 848; Bearce and 
Tirone 2007). Continued geopolitical centrality ensures a continued supply of unconditional aid, 
which allows regime elites to placate rent-seekers and avoid the politically painful process of 
establishing productive institutions meant to discipline rent-seekers and develop the economy.  
 
 From 1947 onwards Korea and Taiwan were vital components of the Truman Doctrine 
alongside Greece and Turkey, and South Korea‟s geopolitical salience increased further with the 
commencement of the Vietnam War. As the largest Arab power, Egypt has played a key role in 
nearly all aspects of Arab affairs, making it a valuable U.S. ally in terms of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the recent U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Jordan‟s geopolitical 
relevance has spanned the longest of the four cases, beginning first with its strong stance against 
pan-Arab socialism in the 1950s to containing the PLO in the 1960s and 1970s to signing a peace 
treaty with Israel and serving as a partner in the “War on Terror” in the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
 By designating four of the top U.S. allies of the past sixty years for comparison and 
demonstrating that the manner in which their leaders used aid drastically varied, this study 
negates geopolitical relevance as a central causal variable. Geopolitical relevance is only of 
secondary importance in that supplies a large volume of aid that is biased in favor of serving 
coalition requirements for the purposes of domestic stability. Yet it cannot be assumed that all 
regimes must distribute aid in the short term to a large number of rent-seekers, or that the 
construction of developmental institutions exerts the same level of political pain in all countries. 
The manner in which geopolitical relevance influences aid formulation depends on demand side 
conditions.  
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 Regime Type. Numerous studies have found a statistically significant relationship 
between democracy and development (see Diamond 1992 for an overview), and the presence of 
greater accountability and transparency in democracies might lead one to hypothesize that 
democracies would use aid in a more efficient fashion than authoritarian dictatorships. 
Alternatively, Bearce (2008) finds that foreign aid provides greater incentive for economic 
reform in authoritarian regimes.  
 
 All four countries, however, were ruled by repressive authoritarian dictatorships during 
the period in question. South Korea was ruled by a U.S.-installed Korean exile, Syngman Rhee, 
from 1948 to 1960, and then by General Park Chung Hee from 1961 to 1979. Under U.S. 
pressure, Park held elections in 1963 under a highly constraining election law, then declared 
martial law in 1972 (Kang 2004, 22, 99). The KMT, initially headed by the Chiang family, has 
continuously ruled Taiwan since 1949, and the first democratic election of a president occurred 
only in 1988, long after U.S. aid ended. Both South Korea and Taiwan maintained large internal 
security apparatuses that engaged in repressive measures against labor. Since 1952, Egypt has 
been ruled by a mass political party underpinned by the support of the military.
4
 Since the 
coming to power in 1921, the Hashemite family has ruled Jordan through hereditary succession. 
Both Egypt and Jordan are highly repressive security states with histories of restricted speech, 
physical coercion, and internal surveillance. Although national parliamentary elections have 
occurred in Egypt and Jordan since the 1980s, these elections should not be viewed as segues to 
democratization (Lust-Okar 2005; Brownlee 2007). The power of Egyptian and Jordanian 
parliaments is largely restricted to reviewing legislation originated by the executive, and 
elections are highly distorted in favor of incumbent regimes.  
 
 The United States has openly supported each of these authoritarian regimes during the 
period in question. Despite American officials‟ complaints of corruption, economic misdirection, 
and sometimes an intense personal dislike of many of these rulers, the U.S. provided financial 
and political support on the basis that incumbent regimes would maintain policies conducive to 
U.S. interests in their respective regions. Authoritarian governments in South Korea and Taiwan 
used aid for institutional upgrading, while authoritarian governments in Egypt and Jordan 
frittered it away on distributive institutions. Authoritarianism, then, cannot be sufficient to 
explain the relationship between aid and institutional outcomes. Rather, authoritarian rulers 
respond to different coalitions with different preferences. 
 
 Neoliberal Conditionality. Drawing upon state-centered theories of late development 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1961; Gerschenkron 1962), many political scientists and economists 
emphasize the detrimental impact of conditionality that requires state retrenchment from the 
economy (Chaudhry 1994). USAID, supported by embassies and the Foreign Commercial 
Service (FCS), has actively promoted a neoliberal agenda of state retrenchment in both Egypt 
and Jordan, which have received the bulk of their aid since 1980. Following this lead, some 
critiques of aid to developing countries have criticized the inappropriateness of the neoliberal 
orthodoxy that donors have increasingly propagated (Abdel Khalek 1982; Handoussa 1990). 
However, three points are worth noting. First, the development agendas pursued by the U.S. in 
                                                 
4
 This party was first known as the Liberation Rally and Arab Socialist Union under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-
1970), then the National Democratic Party under Sadat (1970-1981) and Muhammad Hosni Mubarak (1981-
present). 
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South Korea and Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s were more in line with the neoliberal orthodox 
policies advanced by the IMF and World Bank in later years than with the statist approaches of 
the time (Amsden 1989, 43). Second, although Egypt and Jordan have entered into structural 
adjustment programs with the IMF, due to their geopolitical centrality these agreements are often 
more lax or left unfulfilled (Harrigan, El-Said, and Wang 2006). Third and finally, despite early 
pressure for state retrenchment, USAID has devoted substantial technical assistance for 
institutional capacity-building to Egypt and Jordan. 
 
 Having eliminated some important possible explanations through the Method of 
Difference, we can also do the same through the Method of Agreement: “Nothing can be the 
cause of a phenomenon which is not a common circumstance in all the instances of the 
phenomenon (Cohen and Nagel 1934, 255).” Aid to Egypt and Jordan has resulted in similar 
outcomes in that both display some degree of distribution, and likewise South Korea and Taiwan 
are similar in that they exhibit degrees of developmentalism. Yet one important initial condition 
differs within these pairs: 
 
 Market Orientation.  South Korea and Jordan, while pursuing highly interventionist 
strategies, remained fundamentally committed to the private sector as a driving force for late 
development, while Egypt and Taiwan launched into late development with large public sectors 
and, in the case of Egypt, full-blown socialism. As such, general market orientation (public or 
private sector) can also be eliminated as a causal variable. 
 
 Mill‟s Methods thus allow for the elimination of variables that have been employed to 
explain aid inefficiency in the past: aid volume, geopolitics, neoliberal strategy, regime type, and 
market orientation. However, the Methods of Similarity and Difference also assume that all 
variables are accounted for, which cannot be the case in a non-experimental setting. They are 
therefore only a rough cut at deductive elimination, and need to be supplemented with causal 
process-tracing and congruency tests, which allow us to delineate causal mechanisms 
(maximizing internal validity) and compare actual outcomes with rival theoretical predictions 
(reducing overdetermination), respectively (Waldner 1999, 230-232). These procedures will be 
carried out in the case study analyses of subsequent chapters. 
 
Aid, Coalition Politics, and Institutional Contributions 
 
 This project examines the institutional contributions of U.S. aid to Egypt, Jordan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan from both the demand and supply sides. The supply side of the argument 
accounts for how large-scale economic and military assistance from one major donor, the United 
States, has met coalitional requirements and exerted specific institutional effects within this 
domestic political framework. The project focuses on the United States because the nature of aid 
is often donor-specific. The U.S. is the donor most commonly cited as concerned with 
geopolitics. For each case study the project will demonstrate that U.S. officials were acutely 
aware of coalition pressures in geostrategic aid recipients, and configured aid to meet these 
demands. 
 
 On the demand side, the composition of authoritarian coalitions has determined the extent 
to which aid is used for upgrading or distribution. Leaders that based their rule on highly 
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disparate coalitions, such as the Hashemites in Jordan, established institutions of weak domestic 
extraction, patronage-based public employment, and economic protectionism independent of 
foreign aid. U.S. aid has contributed to the durability of these institutions, while also creating 
donor-financed “parallel states” that provide expensive public goods and allow the patronage 
state to remain in place. Unified and narrow coalitions, however, allow elites remain in power 
with minimal distribution, thus allowing rulers to use U.S. aid to establish new and efficient 
institutions. This was the case in Park-era South Korea and Taiwan. Egypt and Rhee-era South 
Korea fall between these two extremes, exhibiting varying degrees of distribution and 
developmentalism.   
  
Following the work of Robert Bates (1981, 2001), a fundamental proposition of this 
project is that rational political action often results in suboptimal institutional outcomes. 
Identifying a clear set of political conditions that have underpinned aid ineffectiveness helps us 
move beyond surface-level explanations of “good governance,” “corruption,” and “the right” 
macroeconomic policies that plague the field of development economics (Burnside and Dollar 
2000; Easterly 2006). It also challenges base claims of “policy autonomy” emanating from the 
literature on the rentier state. Different authoritarian regimes face different budgetary demands 
that arise from different coalitions. As a source of state revenue and expertise, foreign aid is 
incorporated into regime survival strategies. If regimes are politically able to pursue a 
developmental strategy, they will use aid to upgrade institutions. If regimes must distribute to 
remain in power, aid will be funneled to distributive institutions at the expense of economic 
development; it will also be used to build parallel institutions that provide necessary public 
goods and allow the recipient regime to avoid politically painful institutional reforms. 
 
Independent Variable: Coalition Disparity 
 Although coercion is an important component of authoritarian regime durability, all 
rulers depend on the support of a coalition to maintain their rule (Riker 1962; Crystal 1989; 
Geddes 1994; Chaudhry 1997; Waldner 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003; Brownlee 2007; 
Smith 2007). A coalition is comprised of a group of constituencies, which this project 
conceptualizes as class-based societal actors.  The system of mechanisms by which ruling elites 
maintain coalition support is called a coalition strategy. Coalition strategies are based upon the 
provision of selective benefits to coalition members and the exclusion of non-members (Waldner 
1999). Selective benefits can be delivered on a personal, ad-hoc basis, but in terms of explaining 
institutional outcomes, it is institutionalized, class-based benefits delivered through constituency 
clientelism that are the most salient.  
 
 The preferences of ruling coalitions engaged in late development have exerted a 
significant influence on state institutions in the developing world. Although territorial control, 
extractive capacity, and central bureaucracies were well developed in many Western states 
before the onset of industrialization, most states in the post-colonial world did not enter late 
industrialization with these attributes. Institutionalized benefits to coalition members have 
become part of the overall structure of the state in the realms of fiscal practices, modes of state 
economic intervention, the nature of the bureaucracy, and state-capitalist relations. Civil and 
military employment, for example, is a vital kickback to regime supporters in much of the 
developing world (Geddes 1994). These institutions influence economic outcomes by defining 
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the autonomy of state elites to pursue policies for development, the instruments available to 
pursue these policies, and the ability of social groups to influence policy (Waldner 1999, 5).  
 
 Waldner (1999) finds that the most important feature of a coalition with regards to 
institutional outcomes is coalition disparity, the degree to which economic policy preferences of 
class-based coalition members are not unified. If the ruling coalition is large in size and diverse 
in preferences, the preferences of one coalition member will impose costs upon the other. This 
necessitates compensation to each coalition member through side-payments, or payoffs delivered 
for the purpose of maintaining a coalition. Side-payments can be delivered on an ad-hoc, 
personal basis or through constituency clientelism, whereby institutions are set up to funnel 
benefits to entire classes. The more disparate the coalition, the more side-payments required for 
coalitional cohesiveness, and the more costly the coalition is to maintain. 
 
 A disparate coalition is usually comprised of a pro-business group, such as merchants or 
industrialists, and one or more subaltern classes, such as urban or rural labor. Labor prefers 
higher wages, secure employment, and social protection, which raise factor costs and taxes for 
business. Business prefers to maximize profits on goods and services and favors state 
protectionism that raises costs for consumers. While affecting consumers in general, the effects 
of business preferences are particularly acute for laborers, who spend a relatively large portion of 
their incomes on consumption. Disparate coalitions like these have been in place in Egypt since 
1974 and in Jordan since 1921, requiring elites to dispense large, class-based institutional side-
payments as a means of regime preservation. Common side-payments for a disparate coalition 
include heightened public employment and subsidies for popular classes combined with market 
protectionism and tax breaks for the business class. These side-payments exert large demands on 
the budget, and if the domestic tax base is not sufficient, regime elites tend to turn to foreign aid 
or borrowing—rendering these regimes structurally dependent on foreign aid for survival.5 
 
 Alternatively, members of unified coalitions have relatively similar preferences and 
require minimal to no side-payments. Regime elites thus have greater freedom to pursue efficient 
state-building and economic development with aid. The most common unified coalition, and the 
type exemplified in this study, is an alliance between industry and a state technocratic elite. 
Industry can be represented by either state managers in an economy dominated by state-owned 
industries (SOEs) (Taiwan) or by organized private industrialists (South Korea).  In Taiwan, this 
alliance was held together by a powerful party that oversaw a partnership between technocrats 
and the managers in the state-owned sector—though this was not the case in South Korea, where 
Rhee and Park personally cultivated alliances between technocrats and a small number of private 
conglomerates. 
 
 Since the existing work on the rentier state tends to extrapolate coalition size from the 
sheer presence of external rents, it is important to demonstrate that coalitions originate 
independently of them. The size of ruling coalitions could be a product of several factors. 
Waldner (1999) attributes coalition size to elite conflict, claiming that disagreements between 
elites over integration into the global economy caused them to expand their coalitions as a means 
of competing with each other. Another perspective, echoed in Kohli (2004) and Peters and 
                                                 
5
 Another type of disparate coalition could occur between a pro-business faction and landowners hostile to 
industrialization, though this coalition does not appear in any of the cases in this study.  
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Moore (2009), charges that coalition strategies are conditioned by the strength of institutional 
legacies, many of which were left behind by colonial powers. Rulers presiding over weak 
institutional legacies may need to ally themselves with social groups that can help establish 
territorial authority, generate revenue, and staff a central state. Both arguments are relevant to the 
cases examined here. 
 
 The Hashemite regime coalition in Jordan is highly disparate and composed of East Bank 
tribes and merchant-industrialists. This coalition was greatly shaped by the Ottoman institutional 
legacy—namely, weak to non-existent extractive institutions and exceedingly well-armed 
Bedouin tribes in the periphery accustomed to a lifestyle of raiding and receiving protection 
rents. Abdullah I co-opted the Bedouins with civilian and military employment, cash, tax breaks, 
and land. However, because extractive institutions were so weak, he lacked the financial means 
to continue delivering tribal kickbacks (Vatikiotis 1967; Aruri 1972, 4; Moaddel 2002, 30-31). 
Having exhausted his British subsidy, Abdullah allied himself with the East Bank merchant 
community, which provided him with out of pocket “loans” in exchange for low to minimal 
income tax, protected markets, import licenses, and monopoly rights (Amawi 1992, 412; 
Moaddel 2002, 68; Moore 2004, 60-61). Tribal employees in the military and civil service 
routinely complained of the rise in prices brought about by import monopolies (Amawi 1992, 
505-506), while merchants continued to pay high luxury import taxes, dispense “loans” to 
Abdullah, and be saddled with higher factor costs arising from public employment to tribes. The 
Hashemites increased benefits to both groups to maintain the coalition and by the late 1950s, the 
Jordanian state had all of the features of a traditional rentier state, consisting of weak institutions 
of taxation, a distributive state apparatus, a bloated bureaucracy, economic protectionism, and 
collusive ties between the state and merchant-industrialists. 
 
The ruling coalition in Egypt under Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak consists of urban 
labor and an urban bourgeoisie closely linked to foreign capital (Waterbury 1983, 1985, 1993). 
Their predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, expelled landowners and the urban bourgeoisie from 
power in the early 1960s and initiated a massive employment scheme for workers in the civil 
service, military, and bureaucracy. Nasser‟s populism so inclusionary that it undermined 
accumulation of surplus for industrial investment, and while Sadat and Mubarak were no more 
willing to exploit the working class, they reconfigured economic policy so that accumulation 
would occur through foreign investment, borrowing, and deficit financing, with an alleged focus 
on export-led growth (ELG). This required a re-incorporation of the urban bourgeoisie into the 
ruling coalition, which was largely fueled by the use of tax exemptions and special import rights. 
The urban working class was forced to bear the disproportionate burden of taxation and also paid 
higher prices as a result of demand-driven inflation wrought by the rapid influx of foreign 
capital. This prompted additional side-payments to urban labor, such as large subsidy schemes 
and increases in public sector wages throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
In South Korea, Syngman Rhee presided over a narrow coalition of business elites and 
bureaucrats, much like his successor, Park, but was known for his collusion with local capitalists 
and patronage staffing of the bureaucracy. Rhee‟s problem was that he had little institutional 
means to implement a developmental agenda in the aftermath of the Second World War, 
Japanese colonial withdrawal, and the Korean War. Given the weakness of the postwar state 
(most civil servants under the Japanese colonial state had fled or were persecuted as 
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collaborators) and his reliance on this small elite to reconstruct the economy, Rhee could not 
expect to curb their rent-seeking and expect to remain in power. However, Rhee kept the 
coalition narrow by precluding the rise of subaltern classes through land reform and labor 
repression. The most direct implication of a demobilized peasantry and a nonexistent labor 
movement was that Rhee was  neither compelled to find state employment for lower classes nor 
to subsidize their consumption. Rhee was thus able to isolate important sections of the 
bureaucracy from patronage appointments, including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) (Woo 1991, Kang 2002, 2004). 
 
 Coalitions under the Park regime in South Korea and the KMT in Taiwan were highly 
unified business-technocrat alliances. Park presided over the same coalition as Rhee and 
continued to repress subaltern classes, keeping the coalition narrow. Yet Park, unlike Rhee, was 
able to discipline capitalists. This was done in three ways. First, Park‟s initially hostility towards 
business demonstrated to business leaders that they did rely on the state for their livelihoods, and 
that Park was willing to take it away if business did not provide political support or meet 
economic performance goals (Woo 1991, 82-84; Kang 2002, 2004).
6
 Second, the Korean 
economy had largely been reconstructed by 1957, rendering Park less dependent on business for 
reconstruction. Third, the bureaucracy had matured throughout the Rhee era, and the insertion of 
junta members into management positions injected a common ideology and background into the 
bureaucracy (Evans 1995, 52). 
 
 As an émigré single-party regime, the KMT‟s coalition was highly unified. When the 
KMT migrated to Taiwan, it left behind a problematic landlord class that had interfered with 
state-building on the Mainland and, building on Japanese coercive institutions, established direct 
control over Taiwanese peasants in the countryside (Waldner 1999, 128-129). The KMT also 
precluded the emergence of a large native business class; it inherited all former Japanese assets 
and did not sell, instantly generating the largest public sector in the Free World. With no landlord 
class to interfere with industrialization plans, few ties to existing social classes, and the thwarting 
of rival power centers made possible by retaining Japanese property, the KMT thus had fairly 
wide room to maneuver (Wade 1990, 75, 109). Although alien to Taiwan, the KMT brought a 
high level of organization and ideological coherence with it from the Mainland, allowing it to 
insinuate itself into Taiwanese institutions quite rapidly.  
 
Antecedent Condition: Large-Scale Foreign Aid 
 In the greater body of literature foreign aid is classified as an independent variable. 
Without severing dialogue with the mainstream literature, this study departs from this practice: it 
considers aid to be an antecedent rather than an independent variable. Across all four cases I 
make the stylized claim that the level of U.S. foreign aid is “large-scale,” a rough categorization 
that does not allow for variation in the volume of aid received. U.S. foreign aid is conceptualized 
in three ways: 
 
                                                 
6
 In 1961, Park arrested many of the industrialists who had benefited from Rhee‟s policies under the charge that they 
had accumulated “illicit wealth.” The businessmen were publicly humiliated as they were marched through the street 
carrying placards. Rhee later struck a bargain with the businessmen whereby they would be released in exchange for 
meeting output targets and providing political contributions to the ruling party. 
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 Bilateral government-to-government assistance in grants and concessionary loans, 
economic and military. Economic aid need not be provided for developmental purposes nor even 
be classified as developmental. Since all four cases faced significant geopolitical threats and 
would likely have displayed large defense expenditures even in the absence of aid, we can view 
military aid as fungible to an extent. In addition, military aid is important because it enables 
exclusion of non-coalition members and, in some cases, supports military involvement in the 
economy. 
 
 International Financial Institution (IFI)-to-Government Assistance. This includes 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/ World Bank grants and concessionary loans and Paris Club 
debt write-offs in cases where U.S. involvement can be shown to be the driving factor behind the 
aid allocation. As the largest shareholder and the home base of both the World Bank and the 
IMF, the U.S. exercises significant leverage in these institutions and therefore also indirectly 
influences Paris Club debt rescheduling and forgiveness (see Krueger 1992, Woods 2006, 15-
38).
7
 These qualify as cases of single-transfer, large-scale budget support. 
 
 Preferential economic transactions. These transactions with the recipient, typically donor 
government-to-recipient business or donor business-to-recipient business under government 
intervention, would not occur under normal market conditions, and include donor government 
procurement of goods and services and private investment.  
 
 Existing studies of foreign aid are heavily focused on aid‟s numerical value, thereby 
conceptualizing it as direct budget support. Yet in moving the level of analysis to domestic 
politics and coalition maintenance it is necessary to reconceptualize foreign aid as an input. 
Foreign aid rarely surpasses the volumes of external rent afforded by oil, yet it is a more diverse 
resource upon which elites in late developing countries can draw and can far outmatch resources 
available to the opposition. In this sense, the study of foreign aid is a much more difficult and 
complex process than the study of oil revenues. 
 
 Aid comes from multiple sources. Bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental donors 
may have different goals in allocating aid, and may configure aid in ways that best pursue these 
goals. Some donors provide aid for humanitarian (Lumsdaine 1993; Noel and Therien 1995), 
ideological, or commercial (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998) reasons rather than on the basis 
of geopolitical imperative (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Geopolitically-motivated aid implies donor 
preoccupation with the maintenance of friendly regimes, and this aid can generally be viewed as 
highly fungible and disbursed with minimal conditionality, much like oil rents. The fungible 
nature of this aid allows regimes to meet coalition demands easily. By contrast, European and 
Japanese donors have configured aid for more developmental goals, tying aid to specific projects 
that generate little direct budget support.  
 
 As such, aid also comes in many forms, and should be examined in terms of both its 
volume and its constituent parts. Aid can be delivered as government-to-government budget 
support, much like oil revenues; as a program, which creates a group of beneficiaries over the 
long-term; or a project, such as building infrastructure or providing targeted sectoral support in 
the short-term. Unlike oil revenues, aid also comes hand-in-hand with organizations and the 
                                                 
7
 The Paris Club requires recipients to reach an agreement with the IMF before it will reschedule or forgive debt. 
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people that staff them. Aid provides not only financial but also technical resources that might not 
be available in the recipient country. Recipient governments are thus empowered to allocate or 
withhold diverse sources of technical assistance. The manner in which they do so has important 
institutional implications. 
 
Dependent Variable: Institutional Contributions 
 
 The dependent variable, broadly defined, is “institutional contributions.” This is an 
umbrella term for two distinct dependent variables, institutional origins and institutional 
durability. With reference to these four cases, this project is interested how and why U.S. aid has 
sustained and/or created state institutions that are key to economic development. Borrowing from 
Waldner (1999), there are four categories of institution with which this project is concerned: 
 
 Fiscal practices. These are government taxing and spending practices. Taxes can be 
broken into direct revenue, which taxes internal economic activities, and indirect revenue, which 
taxes trade. Spending can be broken into current and capital expenditures. Current expenditures 
include subsidies and other welfare transfers, as well as the salaries of public employees.  
 
 Modes of State Economic Intervention. While fiscal practices exhibit the financial means 
by which states interfere in the economy, this category expresses the broader frameworks by 
which they do so. State economic intervention can be conceptualized as national industrial 
policies or sectoral promotion policies and their corresponding implements, such as ownership 
(private or public), trade policy (tariffs, licenses, quotas, tax breaks, preferential trade), monetary 
policy (interest rates, money supply, and exchange rates), and property rights.  
 
 Nature of the Bureaucracy. This refers to the organization of the state, particularly at the 
national level. Most important are the “autonomy” of the state from rent-seekers, such as 
business or labor, and, relatedly, the manner in which bureaucrats are appointed and promoted. 
Developmental states, such as those in East Asia, display bureaucratic organization close to the 
Weberian ideal-type. They are, to a degree, autonomous from different societal groups, which 
are assumed to be rent-seeking (Krueger 1974; Bhagwati 1982; Olson 1982).  Qualified 
technocrats that are hired and promoted based on merit, and compensated with salaries 
competitive with the private sector, staff the civil service. Sanctions for corruption are clear and 
well-enforced. A pilot agency tends to spearhead and coordinate most development efforts. Most 
notably, a state elite is singularly devoted to the pursuit of economic development, and it directs 
a fiscal policy that is based upon capital accumulation and production, not redistribution 
(Waldner 1999, 144).  
 
 State-Capitalist Relations. This refers to the nature of the relationship between capitalists 
and the state, encompassing information flows between the two parties as well as the relative 
balance of power between them. As Evans (1995) has pointed out, states that are fully 
autonomous from society cannot be developmental: they lack vital exchanges of information 
with the private sector, as well as the ability to decentralize implementation (Evans 1995, 158; 
Schneider and Maxfield 1997, 5). Developmental states, then, also have intensely close linkages 
with capitalists, a phenomenon known as “embedded autonomy.” While business is still assumed 
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to be rent-seeking, developmental states carve out autonomy through their ability to discipline 
business, particularly industry.  
 
 The fundamental link between aid and institutional contributions is the notion that foreign 
aid is incorporated into a broader framework by which institutions are constructed to deliver 
benefits to coalition members. Aid can make institutional contributions in two different ways. 
First, to the extent that it can be considered fungible (or that it is actually delivered as direct 
budget support), aid supports the general budget and its various political priorities (“budget 
support”). For example, if a recipient receives $200 million for a water project that the state 
would have undertaken anyway, $200 million of other revenues can be freed up for expanding 
the civil service or supporting an inefficient state-owned enterprise (SOE). The $200 million in 
project aid is therefore equivalent to $200 million in cash budget support. Second, aid can be tied 
to specific programs or projects (“targeted aid”). For example, USAID might provide the funds 
and staff for a special economic zone, support a microfinance project, or provide technical 
expertise for a trade agreement. Some aid encapsulates both targeted aid and budget support, 
especially more complex, multi-component programs like the Commodity Import Program in 
Egypt or the cash transfer programs in Egypt and Jordan.  
 
Table 1 provides a summary of potential institutional contributions in fiscal policy, 
modes of state economic intervention, business-state relations, and the nature of the bureaucracy. 
The institutional contributions are divided by whether or not aid was used for upgrading (white) 
or for distribution (gray); whether or not the specific institutional contribution is an instance of 
genesis or durability will vary by case. Table 1 demonstrates the same types of aid can make 
different institutional contributions depending on the coalition strategy of the recipient regime, 
particularly in the case of budget support. 
 
Table 1 
Foreign Aid and Institutional Contributions 
 
 Type of Aid 
Type of 
Institution 
Budget Support Targeted Aid 
Fiscal Policy  Reduce domestic revenues by 
reducing the need to tax various 
segments of the population. 
 Donor-financed project aid, particularly 
in infrastructure, relieves the state from 
extraction. 
 Tax policy remains unaffected while 
additional foreign revenue is used 
for long-term developmental 
projects, such as infrastructure, 
 Adjust levels of taxing and spending 
towards optimal levels through 
conditionality. 
 Meet optimal levels of taxing and 
spending based on technical assistance 
Modes of State 
Economic 
Intervention 
 Support inefficient state-owned 
enterprises. 
 Allow for preferential tax breaks 
and subsidization of industry and 
consumers. 
 . 
 Support efficient state-owned 
enterprises. 
 Allow the state to invest in large-
scale infrastructure, health, and 
 Trade liberalization or structural 
adjustment through conditionality 
and/or technical assistance. 
 Empower local stakeholders in favor of 
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education as a public good. economic reform with financial and/or 
technical assistance 
Nature of the 
Bureaucracy 
 Provide funds for superfluous public 
employment, possibly based on 
patronage. 
 Cause taxation and information-
collecting institutions to decay by 
reducing incentives to tax.  
  
 Provide funds for higher salaries, 
allowing the state to hire a limited 
number of qualified applicants. 
 Engender civil service reform or other 
bureaucratic change through 
conditionality and/or technical 
assistance. 
 Enrich local bureaucracy through 
sustained collaboration and knowledge 
transfer between donor and recipient 
 Train local experts that are absorbed 
into the recipient bureaucracy. 
 Create “pockets of efficiency” within 
local bureaucracy through 
unsustainable hiring practices and 
donor-funded technical units. 
State-Capitalist 
Relations 
 Discourage institutionalized 
interaction between the state and 
capitalists by providing 
disincentives for taxation of capital. 
 Discourage development of 
domestic industry as a means of 
funding state revenue by providing 
external revenue. 
 Undermine credibility of local business 
associations through conflicting aid 
projects and programs. 
  
 Elevate state as a provider of capital 
to business, giving it leverage over 
business actions. 
 Strengthen communication between the 
state and business by providing 
technical and financial assistance for 
peak and sectoral business associations. 
 Strengthen local capital by helping it 
forge alliances with foreign capital. 
 Strengthen position of state vis-à-vis 
rent-seekers in the private sector. 
 Suppress popular classes through 
assistance to police forces. 
 
 A final type of institutional contribution is not fully captured in Table 1. Rentiers and 
semi-rentiers experience severe coalition demands that result in state inefficiency, most 
importantly limited domestic extraction and an unqualified and bloated bureaucracy. These 
institutional traits seriously circumscribe the ability of the central patronage state to provide a 
range of public goods to society, including infrastructure, which is expensive to build and 
maintain and requires a competent set of engineers for planning, building, and maintenance, as 
well as a reliable system of property rights and regulations that impose minimal transaction costs 
on business. Infrastructure and certain categories of public goods are absolutely necessary in all 
countries, yet states governed by disparate coalitions would be unable to provide them without 
rulers risking political demise by altering their existing coalition strategies. 
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 Geopolitically-motivated donors, such as the U.S., are acutely aware of coalitional 
pressures and configure aid as such. This “two-way” effect affects many aspects of aid 
formulation, but it is most evident in the willingness of the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) to set up in geopolitical allies “parallel institutions” that provide 
necessary public goods while allowing the politically vital patronage state to remain in place. 
Parallel  institutions require longstanding commitments for financial and technical resources that 
geopolitically irrelevant states would be unable to extract. These are instances where U.S. aid 
interacting with domestic politics can account for the origination of a specific institution. In these 
cases the United States as a donor provides the institution. 
 
 One type of parallel institution provides infrastructure. Putnam (1993) and Brautigam 
(1996) designate level of service provided by the government, such as percentage of the 
population with access to electricity, as an indicator of state capacity. Yet as Kamel (1999, 4) 
points out, in many LDCs these functions are provided by donors. Donor provision of 
infrastructure is thus an important focus in this study, as this practice indirectly supports the 
patronage state by allowing aid recipients the luxury of maintaining it.  
 
 Bureaucracies must originate, coordinate, and monitor development projects and make 
sure that they are sustainable. Yet many developing country bureaucracies face what Kahler has 
coined “the orthodox paradox,” whereby a bureaucracy that is the root of many economic woes 
is ultimately the entity tasked with fixing them (Evans 1992, 140). Bureaucracies are not self-
reforming, and reform efforts can be constrained by domestic politics and resource requirements. 
These obstacles render the presence of an external agent (i.e., a donor) important (Kame1 1999, 
8).  
 
 A second type of parallel institution thus serves as a “pocket of efficiency (Evans 1995)” 
that services businesspeople. Pockets of efficiency are primarily donor-financed and staffed, 
semiautonomous government agencies that provide first-world service in a third-world 
environment. They enforce property rights, cut through red tape, and may even preside over 
entire parallel segments of the economy, essentially running a liberal market operation in an 
otherwise state-dominated economy. These institutions are part of the recipient‟s state, being 
embedded in local ministries and employing local staff. After agreeing on the uses of the money 
(number of staff to be hired, office equipment, transportation costs, etc), the donor makes a large 
lump-sum transfer to the recipient government, which then uses the money to hire qualified 
personnel at market-competitive salaries, as well as to provide them with any necessary office 
and logistical support. These local hires may be supported by massive, open order technical 
assistance projects supplied by the same donor. Pockets of efficiency may also be supported 
constituencies within society that benefit from their services and support their continued 
existence. In many cases, the donor may even help strengthen these constituencies through work 
with local business associations, providing them with greater institutionalized access to the state 
(Schamis 1999; Ozel 2003) and greater organizational capacity and resources.  
 
 The significance of parallel states in the larger aid literature has yet to be recognized, and 
within the scholarship on political development they have passed entirely under the radar.  
Although the term “parallel state” is new, great powers, both as modern donors and historical 
colonial powers, have engaged in the construction of these institutions at varying points in time 
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and across a diverse geography; the four cases in this study are simply prominent examples.
8
 
These practices are widespread and they have important implications. Not only are large swathes 
of state functions being performed by external entities in many countries, the presence of parallel 
states allows distributive regimes to avoid politically-painful institutional reforms at the national 
level.  In one sense, parallel institutions represent an efficient use of aid. Yet in another sense 
they allow inefficient, distributive practices to persist (and in many cases, aid also contributes to 
the durability of these institutions as well). 
 
Case Summaries 
South Korea (Rhee) 
 Syngman Rhee‟s rule is usually described as a brief respot between the efficient and 
strong Japanese colonial state that fell in 1945 and its resurrection under Park in 1961. Although 
Rhee did try to exact large amounts of U.S aid, employ patronage to staff large sections of the 
bureaucracy, and allocate project aid on a highly personal basis, his rule should not be measured 
with a neoliberal stick. Rhee was able to make some real institutional advances because he 
presided over a narrow coalition of business elites and bureaucrats that was not much different 
from that of Park. The most direct implication of a demobilized peasantry and a nonexistent 
labor movement was that Rhee was not compelled to find state employment for lower classes, 
nor did he have to distribute aid to them as a side-payment. Rhee was thus able to isolate 
important sections of the bureaucracy from patronage appointments, including the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB). U.S. advisers 
trained employees in the BOB, which was linked to the U.S. mission through the Combined 
Economic Board, and also worked in conjunction with Japanese advisers to fill most bureaucratic 
positions with qualified Koreans who had taken the Japanese civil service exam (Kohli 2004, 
64). While Rhee did not retain former Korean managers from the Japanese colonial period (as 
they were seen as collaborators), he did leave them in state bodies related to taxation. During 
Rhee‟s rule, direct taxes constituted between 25 and 34 percent of domestic revenues, 
substantially more than other developing countries at the time (Kohli 2004, 60). 
  
 Additionally, because he did not have to respond to demand for side-payments from a 
broad coalition, Rhee was free to devote full attention—and significant quantities of U.S. aid-- to 
a small number of Korean industrialists, using preferential allocation of former Japanese 
holdings and U.S. project loan aid to build up a concentrated domestic industrial base. This 
occurred most notably in the textile industry, which was used to jumpstart export-led growth 
under Park (see Amsden 1989). Rhee maximized recipient benefits of the American loans by 
maintaining an overvalued official exchange rate, and profits could be made from exchange rate 
differentials on ICA project loans (Woo 1991, 68). In return, these businessmen made substantial 
donations to Rhee‟s Liberal Party (Woo 1991, 68-69). It was Rhee, then, who created the tri-pé 
role for the state as a mediator between foreign capital and a small number of local industrialists.  
  
 Finally, Rhee was able to avoid or delay persistent American efforts to impose liberal 
policies that would retrench the state‟s role in the economy. Rhee saw that the U.S., for 
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 Brazil‟s National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE), a semiautonomous state investment vehicle, was 
formed as a result of recommendations from the Joint Brazil-United States Mission (1950-1952), and in the 1960s 
received a great deal of its revenue from PL 480 counterpart funds (Baer and Villela 1980).  
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geopolitical reasons, wanted to re-integrate South Korea as a subordinate member into a 
resurrected Greater Asian Co-prosperity Sphere led by the Japanese (Woo 1991, 52-55; Cumings 
1987, 307). He resisted. By maintaining an overvalued exchange rate and a policy of industrial 
protectionism towards a small number of businessmen, Rhee advanced a program of import-
substitution industrialization (ISI) in the face of staunch American opposition.
9
 Economic aid 
peaked in 1956 at $322 million, and was gradually reduced upon the basis that (1) reconstruction 
was coming to an end; and (2) aid was supporting ISI (Davenport 1960, 2). The fact that Rhee 
took these risks (and that the U.S. saw a reduction in aid as politically feasible) indicates that, 
relative to Egypt and Jordan, Rhee‟s regime was not structurally dependent on aid for survival—
he did not need large volumes of aid to meet coalitional demands. 
 
South Korea (Park) and Taiwan 
 Freed by unified coalitions, Park-era South Korea and Taiwan used U.S. aid to establish 
new, more efficient institutions. Technical assistance was assimilated into powerful, home-
grown pilot agencies that coordinated the development agenda. Loans and grants were used to 
elevate the state to the position of a powerful intermediary between local business and foreign 
capital, allowing the state to punish rent-seeking and reward good performance through the 
power of the purse. Financial assistance was devoted to long-term capital expenditures such as 
education and agricultural extension services, though attention was also paid to cultivating 
domestic funding for these projects. Aid was used to suppress popular classes in order to keep 
the coalition narrow and factor costs down. Finally, developmental regimes were not highly 
dependent on the immediate and widespread distribution of foreign aid for political survival, and 
were able to reject donor conditionality that they perceived as antithetical to their political or 
economic interests.  
 
 However, the timing and extent of U.S.-backed economic reform varies slightly between 
the two cases. Although Park eventually pushed through several exchange rate devaluations and 
trade liberalization upon American recommendations, there were some aspects of state 
intervention that he refused to relinquish, namely the personalistic distribution of foreign capital 
and aid projects, as well as export subsidization. As a result, U.S. economic aid dropped from 
$234.5 million in 1969 to $36.7 million in 1975, then was phased out completely in 1982. As 
economic aid was reduced, the U.S. mission came strongly behind the IMF and even threatened 
to withhold Development Loan Funds and PL 480 aid until the Korean government adopted the 
IMF policy reform package. The recommendations included currency devaluation, abandoning 
export subsidies, and placing ceilings on foreign loans (Woo 1991, 110). With the exception of 
reducing export subsidies, the Koreans eventually “swallowed the IMF pill (Woo 1991, 110),” 
causing a major uproar from the chaebol. In 1971, the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) 
appealed to Park to freeze the curb on foreign loans, decrease interest rates, and reduce corporate 
tax. When Park did not act, the FKI became aggressive, telling Park that he would have to slash 
the government budget by half unless he acceded to their demands (Woo 1991, 111-112). Park 
eventually orchestrated a massive bail-out in 1972. 
 
                                                 
9
 Whatever liberal policies Rhee did enact, such as two exchange rate devaluations and a short-lived privatization of 
the banking sector, were delayed and the product of much struggle between Rhee and the U.S. mission (Amsden 
1989, 44-48). 
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 U.S. pressure for economic reform in Taiwan was much more successful. The advice of 
U.S. consultants is widely credited for Taiwan‟s 1958-1962 move towards export-led growth 
(Little 1979, 174; Cumings 1987, 71). Between 1958 and 1961, the exchange rate system was 
dismantled and replaced with a significantly devalued unitary rate. Tariffs were reduced and 
import controls eased. In 1960, the government enacted the famous Nineteen Point Policy 
Reform, which contained a number of recommendations from the U.S. and the IMF intended to 
reduce inflation, decrease the budget deficit, and control the money supply (Wade 1990, 84, 88, 
94).
10
 These liberal policies were not forced by conditionality, but couched by political support 
from the highest levels of the regime (Lundberg 1979, 269).  
 
 The general consensus is that Taiwan was “more dependent” on American aid and thus 
had to follow recommendations to a greater extent than did Korea. However, there is substantial 
evidence that Chiang and his technocrats sided with the Americans at the outset rather than 
having conditionality hoisted upon them. Since the KMT party was highly unified around 
Chiang, who favored reform in pursuit of growth, and the party controlled the vast majority of 
the productive sector, reform policies faced little opposition. In South Korea, by contrast, there 
was a great deal more opposition to the policy reform package, chiefly because the Park regime 
had allied itself with a small group of capitalists that benefited from ISI policies under Rhee and 
which would be hurt by liberalization measures. Park was ultimately able to implement the 
policy reforms, but they were much-delayed and followed by a massive corporate bailout. 
Narrow coalitions ultimately allowed both regimes to push through the major reform schemes 
being advocated by their countries‟ respective U.S. aid mission; had these regimes also 
incorporated popular sectors there is no way that reforms reducing market protectionism and a 
reduction in state spending would have been feasible. 
   
Jordan 
U.S. aid to Jordan has been delivered mostly in the form of budget support and 
infrastructure projects. Jordan has used U.S. aid to sustain distributive institutions that deliver 
side-payments to tribes and the East Bank economic elite, including public employment, weak 
extraction, state-owned industries, and consumer subsidies. Between 1961 and 1975, military 
employment tripled and civil employment increased by two-thirds (Tal 2002, 75; Moore 2004, 
68). The state grew even larger during the 1970s, when U.S. aid was briefly overtaken by that of 
the Gulf petromonarchies. Between 1970 and 1985 the size of the civil service increased by 300 
percent, and by the mid-1980s, the state employed 50 percent of the labor force, the equivalent of 
one public servant for every ten children in Jordan (Piro 1998, 66-67). During this time aid 
constituted as much as 86 percent of central government revenues (Bint Talal 2004: 59; Carroll 
2003: 35; Moore 2004: 104; World Bank 2007). When the U.S. re-assumed the role of major 
donor in the mid-1980s, aid conditionality had become the norm, yet the U.S. continued to 
provide aid free of conditionality. Even after a massive financial crisis in 1989, when Jordan was 
forced to begin a long string of agreements with the IMF, USAID did not significantly re-focus 
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 At the same time, however, state involvement in export promotion grew. Exports were promoted through customs 
rebates on intermediate goods to be used in export production, tax incentives, cheap credit, and direct subsidies. 
Additionally, regime imperatives to preclude the development of alternative power centers in private industry 
trumped any American recommendations in favor of large-scale privatization. We thus should not over-exaggerate 
the success of American free-market pressure (Wade 1990, 52; Waldner 1999, 130). 
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its strategy toward structural adjustment and bolstering the private sector, which had been 
weakened by decades of collusion between the state and a small elite.  
 
 Even after the accession of Abdullah II, widely considered to be a reformer, larger and 
larger portions of U.S. aid have been committed to the cash transfer program, which provides 
budget support for various regime priorities. These priorities remain distributive. Although down 
from 69 percent in 2001, in 2006 compensation of employees still accounted for 40 percent of 
government expenditures. Subsidies have risen from around 12 percent of expenditure in the 
mid-1990s to 38 percent in 2005 and 31 percent in 2006. Many of these subsidies and transfers 
apply only to civil service or military employees, an effort to protect them from a general 
retrenchment of food and energy subsidies, roaring inflation, and the imposition of a value-added 
tax. Jordan still remains highly dependent on foreign aid, which financed 42 percent of 
government expenditures in 2003 and 12 percent in 2006. 
 
 While the local bureaucracy was used as a means of political patronage and public 
largesse, the Point Four/ USAID and U.N Refugee and Works Agency (UNRWA) bureaucracies 
grew in parallel to the Jordanian rentier state, performing essential state functions but never 
making an attempt to engage Jordanian institutions in meaningful reform (Kingston 2001).
11
 
Point Four built a significant portion of Jordanian infrastructure in the 1950s and 1960s, 
including transport networks, hydraulic infrastructure, and basic institutions in health and 
education.
 
This practice was continued by Point Four‟s successor, USAID, and has freed 
Jordanian elites from undertaking politically painful institutional reforms to expand domestic 
revenue and rationalize the bureaucracy, but it has also rendered Jordan practically dependent on 
donors for infrastructure. To this day, USAID has funded the maintenance of infrastructure, 
particularly in the water sector, because the Jordanian state cannot do so itself. More recently, 
USAID has assisted in the establishment of “pockets of efficiency,” such as the Jordan 
Investment Board (JIB) and the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA) around 
Jordan‟s only port. Both institutions help investors cut through red tape and are staffed with 
qualified technocrats earning market-competitive salaries. They service narrow slivers of the 
economy that either (1) attract more rents for the state, such as port areas; and/or (2) benefit a 
segment of the East Bank economic elite that has developed ties to Gulf capital. 
 
Egypt 
  As in Jordan. Egyptian rulers have had to answer to a disparate coalition of labor and 
business. Yet while Jordan‟s East Bank industrialists are inward looking and have few links to 
foreign capital, Egypt‟s post-1974 “infitah” bourgeoisie has intimate connections with 
multinationals. Since the 1970s, U.S. economic aid has helped the Egyptian regime maintain a 
dual system: an inflated public sector whose institutions deliver side-payments to lower and 
middle classes, and a parallel set of institutions aimed at a small number of capitalists in the 
private sector.  
   
 These dual needs were met from 1975 to 1992 through the Public Sector Commodity 
Import Program (CIP), which allowed public and a small number of private sector parties to 
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 UNRWA is considered here due to the central role of the U.S. in its creation and relatively large U.S. 
contributions to the organization. U.S. policymakers viewed UNRWA as an explicit vehicle by which infrastructure 
could be provided to Palestinian refugees without encroaching on East Bank patronage networks. 
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contract low-interest loans for the purchase of American commodities and capital goods. The 
loans were then paid back to the Egyptian government in local currency as a form of budget 
support. From 1975 to 1992, the Public Sector CIP accounted for $7.6 billion of total economic 
aid, and had nourished a small capitalist class with collusive ties to the state (Weinbaum 1986, 
42). Once the CIP became increasingly oriented to the private sector in 1986, and totally 
exclusive to it in 1992, it extended to a broader group of beneficiaries. By the time the Private 
Sector CIP was terminated in 2008, it had provided $3.6 billion in financing to over 1,850 
Egyptian private companies over a series of more than 12,000 individual transactions (“Private 
Sector CIP”). Known as the “infitah class” or hitan (“whales”), this small group of businessmen 
still forms the core of the capitalist class today, and many of their needs have continued to be 
serviced by U.S. project aid (Sfakianakis 2004). Most notably, USAID has also provided support 
to the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt and the Federation of Egyptian Industries, the 
former of which has served as an informal rallying point for the formulation of economic 
policy—particularly economic reforms. A quick survey of American Chamber of Commerce 
members, key economic ministers of the past fifteen years, and businessmen that have utilized 
the CIP reveals a striking overlap (Anonymous Interview, 12/23/2007).   
 
 Much like its use of the CIP in the pre-1991 period, USAID has continued to provide 
assistance to the private sector while also supporting the Egyptian budget—and therefore a large 
public sector. No other USAID program better exemplifies this principle than the cash transfer 
program, which commenced in 1984.
12
 Beginning in 1992, USAID started attaching formal 
“benchmarks” to the cash transfer program; over the years, these benchmarks have touched on 
all aspects of economic reform, ranging from privatization to regulatory reform to feasibility 
studies. While there is little evidence that benchmarks force reforms through a conditionality 
mechanism, the program has two other benefits. First, the cash transfer operates in conjunction 
with various technical assistance projects that help the Egyptian ministries in implementing 
reform benchmarks. Second, the cash transfer program is a stealthy vehicle for direct budget 
support. Thus, while the cash transfer supports economic reform in theory, it also supports 
Egyptian budget priorities in favor of the public sector.  
 
 By 2000, the GOE had privatized only 29 percent of SOEs, a number of which were 
bought up a rock-bottom prices by well-connected businessmen within the NDP (Sfakianakis 
2004, 85-86). Patterns in public sector largesse have also exhibited very little change. In 1997, 
the government instituted an optional early retirement scheme for public sector employees, but 
only 182,000 bought into it (IBM Consulting 2004, 17). Compensation of employees, which has 
averaged roughly 30 percent of expenditures, has shown no general decline between 1990 and 
2006. Subsidies have actually increased from 12 percent of expense in 1991 to 33 percent in 
2006 (World Bank 2007). Facing rising inflation, the proposed FY 2008-2009 budget included a 
30 percent increase in public sector wages and subsidies (Abdel-Razek 2008).  
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 Roughly $200 million per year is set aside annually for the cash transfer, whose share of economic aid has risen as 
funding for project aid and CIP has drawn down. The cash transfer program has been assumed under a number of 
titles: Sector Policy Reform I, II, and II (1992-1994, 1995-1997, 1996-1998, respectively); Development Support 
Program I and II (1999-2002, 2001-2009) (“USAID Status Report,” 1990, 1998). For an excellent overview of each 
program and its associated benchmarks see Salim (2006). 
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 To implement the highly technical economic reform benchmarks without addressing the 
political dynamite of civil service reform, the U.S. and other donors have worked outside of the 
system. In the late 1990s USAID adopted an Implementation Letter Mechanism (ILM) by which 
salaries of employees in special “technical units” at key economic ministries would be indirectly 
financed by USAID at private sector rates. In 2007, American ILMs financed the salaries of 
twenty to twenty-five staff at the Central Bank and almost all of the sub-governors, ten to twelve 
senior advisers at the Ministry of Finance, thirty staff at the Ministry of Investment (distributed 
primarily among the Capital Markets, Insurance, and Mortgage authorities), and seven to eight 
staff at the Ministry of Industry and Trade through (Anonymous Interview, 5/10/2007). 
Americans consultants contracted by USAID—namely the behemoth Technical Assistance for 
Policy Reform Activity I and II projects implemented by Chemonics International and Bearing 
Point, respectively—provide additional support to the technical units. As one technical unit head 
claimed of regular civil servants, “Leave them to drink their coffee, read their newspaper, and 
catch the bus before 1 o‟clock (Anonymous Interview, 12/12/2007).” 
 
Chapter Layout 
The case studies set forth in subsequent chapters will demonstrate that the composition of 
recipient coalitions best explains the institutional contributions of U.S. aid to Egypt, Jordan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan.  Chapter 3 discusses the rise of unified conservative coalitions in 
South Korea and Taiwan against Japanese institutional legacies and, in the case of South Korea, 
U.S. military occupation. It then explains how these narrow coalitions used U.S. aid for 
institutional upgrading yet were able to buck American conditionality at times. Chapter 4 
discusses the origins of disparate coalitions and their preferences in Jordan and Egypt; this 
chapter does not include a discussion of U.S. aid. Rather, the purpose of this chapter is to both 
demonstrate that these coalitions did not emerge as a result of access to external rents as is 
posited by rentier theory, as well as to explain the origins of institutions that aid perpetuated in 
future years. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the role of U.S. aid in maintaining disparate coalitions and 
corresponding distributive institutions in Egypt and Jordan, with additional detail into parallel 
institutions that provided infrastructure for both countries. Chapter 7 addresses the impact of 
U.S. aid during the period of neoliberal economic reform in Egypt and Jordan. It examines how 
neoliberal conditionality has affected Egyptian and Jordanian institutional side-payments in the 
context of continued geopolitical centrality and access to U.S. aid, arguing that aid has served 
two purposes. First, it has maintained old distributive institutions, and in some cases, helped 
regimes court new sources of rent that might replace foreign aid and loans. Second, it has 
established “pockets of efficiency” that manage limited economic reforms that benefit a small 
group of winners from these policy changes while imposing minimal costs on potential losers 
within the coalition. 
 
 Focusing on such a highly clientelistic relationship between donor and recipient may 
hinder the argument‟s generalizability, an issue that I address in the final chapter. However, 
given that the U.S. is still the world‟s largest bilateral donor in raw terms (see Figure 5), these 
four recipients and the highly fungible nature of their aid are likely not unique. Israel, as well as 
the more contemporary cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan are high-profile, policy-relevant 
cases that surely share a similar relationship with the United States and its foreign aid programs. 
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 This project makes two major contributions to the study of foreign aid and institutions. 
First, it adds additional layers to the literature of the “rentier state.” By tracing the route of U.S. 
aid from donor to coalition member, highlighting institutional contributions along the way, the 
project challenges the traditional notion that access to unfettered external rents elevates the state 
to a position of autonomy relative to society. Rather, aid accrues to specific coalition members 
who, for various reasons, have been able to see their economic policy preferences become 
reality. Furthermore, the project explicitly attributes the origins of recipient coalitions to factors 
other than the presence of foreign aid. Second, the project generates new information on the 
origins and functions of parallel states in aid recipients. These states allow patronage institutions 
to remain in place, yet provide infrastructure and minimal transaction costs for limited sectors of 
the economy. The study of parallel institutions could spur a new and exciting research agenda, 
particularly within the literature on economic reform. 
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